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1 Very low fertility in Pacific 
Asian countries
Causes and policy responses
Gavin Jones, Paulin Tay Straughan,  
and Angelique Chan
Introduction
Only 40 years ago, population experts were still worried about a population 
explosion that would threaten the future of humanity. Fortunately, while popula-
tion growth is currently largely under control, sub-Saharan Africa and parts of 
South Asia still face massive increases with very serious potential consequences.1 
Paradoxically, however, a new problem is emerging, with its key locus in Pacific 
Asia (the term used in this book to refer to Asian countries with a Pacific littoral). 
This problem is ultra-low fertility. Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, and 
Hong Kong SAR are among the very lowest-fertility countries in the whole world, 
and even China has reached fertility levels lower than those in many European 
countries. Fertility has sunk so low in many East Asian countries that if these 
levels continue over long periods, populations will face accelerating population 
decline not very far into the future. Not only this, but changes in age distributions in 
such populations raise major new questions for planning of economic and social 
welfare. The best-recognized prospect raised by ultra-low fertility is population 
aging, which brings with it an entirely new set of issues, for example, increasing 
old-age dependency ratios, financing old age and old age health care, continuing 
familial support of the elderly and elderly political participation. But there are 
many others, for example, the decline in size and changing age structure of the 
workforce, and the declining visibility of and perhaps attention paid to the needs 
and interests of children and young people.
Existing pro-natalist policies do not appear to be having much effect in 
these countries, and although governments realize that more needs to be done 
to encourage fertility, exactly what should be done remains elusive. Part of this 
elusiveness stems from a lack of information on what motivates people in Asia to 
marry in the first place, and once married, to have, or not have, children. (The route 
of bearing children without marrying is a little-travelled one in Asian countries, 
and not socially sanctioned.)
Though the shift in emphasis in population policy from anti-natalism to pro-na-
talism in some Asian countries over the course of just a decade or two is striking, 
the underlying issue is the same: whether governments have a legitimate interest 
in nudging fertility rates in desired directions, and if so, how policies designed to 
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2 Gavin Jones, Paulin Tay Straughan, and Angelique Chan 
accomplish this relate to family and social policy. Thus, it is of some relevance to 
recapitulate briefly the history of anti-natalist policies.
The case for fertility reduction in high-fertility countries
The general consensus among economists has been that there are social and 
economic benefits to be achieved by reducing fertility rates in high-fertility 
conditions. The literature on this is vast, but three references summarizing 
the received wisdom are National Research Council, 1986 (which drew very 
cautious conclusions), Cassen, 1994, and Birdsall, Kelley and Sinding, 2001. 
Thus, although there have always been dissenters (for example, Simon, 1981), 
the consensus among most economists over the most active period of family 
planning efforts was that governments are justified in taking active steps to 
bring birth rates down – in the interest of the welfare of future generations. The 
economic case for family planning was bolstered by the arguments of environ-
mentalists, and those dealing with issues of food and water availability (see 
Pimentel, et al., 1999; Alexandratos, 2005; Falkenmark, 1997). 
Family planning programs were seen as the most direct route to achieving the 
goal of fertility reduction. They were designed to make information on contra-
ception more readily available, and to facilitate the adoption of contraception by 
couples wishing to do so (Seltzer, 2002). Studies that estimated “unmet need” 
for contraception indicated that many couples at risk of pregnancy and who did 
not want any more children were not doing anything to protect themselves from 
pregnancy. Satisfying this unmet need was seen as appropriate in both meeting 
people’s expressed needs and in lowering the overall level of fertility (see, for 
example, Sinding, Ross, and Rosenfield, 1994; Casterline and Sinding, 2000). 
Many family planning programs went well beyond the mere supply of informa-
tion and services, engaging in campaigns to persuade people of the advantages of 
delayed marriage and small family size. 
But there are other routes as well – arguably more fundamental ones – to low 
fertility. Studies dealing with the determinants of fertility show consistently that 
fertility is inversely related to education of women, for example. In general terms, 
fertility is inversely related to levels of economic development and (a somewhat 
different indicator) human development (see UNFPA, 2003: 4), and an ongoing 
debate is therefore about whether “development is the best contraceptive” (the 
slogan adopted by many at the World Population Conference in 1974), or whether 
the urgency of reducing birth rates calls for more direct measures. Finally, to 
confuse the situation even more, there are countries (Myanmar a notable example) 
where fertility has fallen to fairly low levels without either much evidence of 
development or the assistance of an official family planning program. 
Two key problems with the family planning approach were:
In its implementation by governments that perceived (and were pressed by  •
donors to perceive) the lowering of population growth as an overriding goal, 
the basic rights of the population were often given second place.2
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Very low fertility in Pacific Asian countries 3
Family planning programs had limited success in settings in which religious  •
opposition was not effectively counteracted, and where economic develop-
ment was sluggish and not effectively felt by the masses (examples include 
Pakistan, the Philippines, and parts of Latin America).
Over the past decade, demographic trends have taken the wind out of the 
sails of the population-control movement. Fertility rates have fallen consistently 
across the world, though Africa and parts of South Asia are regions where fertility 
remains high, massive population increases are still in prospect, and the effect of 
this on human well-being requires ongoing attention. Still, population projections 
by the United Nations now show world population peaking at below 10 billion, 
whereas figures closer to 15 billion had earlier been thought likely.
The collapse of fertility in East Asia and the delayed switch 
to pro-natalist policies
There is now an interesting mix of situations in the world: in some countries, 
lowered fertility is arguably crucial to sustainability and the well-being of popu-
lations; in others, increased fertility is arguably equally critical to future well-
being; in others, a laissez-faire approach to fertility seems justified. In the first 
two groups of countries, the issue of whether, and if so how, governments should 
become involved in matters that are frequently argued to be private and confined 
to the bedroom continues to exercise the minds of government planners.
The second group – countries needing to increase fertility – includes countries 
such as Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. Over the past five years or 
so, fertility in the first four of these countries has fallen to levels below those 
of almost all countries in Europe. There is controversy about where China and 
Thailand fit: needing to reduce fertility further or needing to raise it. Table 1.1 
gives a brief summary of the population prospects faced by some of these countries. 
It shows that Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore have now reached such 
low fertility levels that population declines have begun or are in prospect. The 
momentum towards a shrinking of population, inherent in the age structure and 
fertility levels, is well documented for these countries. In particular, they face 
sharp contractions in numbers in the adolescent and young-adult age groups, 
the key age groups affecting the size and dynamism of the workforce. Only a 
sharp rise in fertility or very high levels of immigration (the latter to some extent 
built into United Nations projections for Singapore and Hong Kong SAR) could 
prevent population decline. Politicians and planners in these countries are viewing 
ultra-low fertility as a “crisis”.
It is important to note that some four or five decades ago, four of these East 
Asian countries with ultra-low fertility (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and 
Hong Kong) were facing high fertility and rapid population growth; all of them 
were considered densely populated, and their governments were very concerned 
at the prospect of rapid population growth. It is not surprising, then, that they 
were pioneers in adopting policies to reduce fertility, including family planning 
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4 Gavin Jones, Paulin Tay Straughan, and Angelique Chan 
Table 1.1 Trends in Total Fertility Rates and projected population growth, selected East 
Asian countries 
Total Fertility Rates Japan South Korea Taiwan Singapore Hong Kong SAR
1995 1.42 1.64 1.78 1.67 n.a.
1996 1.43 1.70 1.76 1.66 1.19
1997 1.39 1.54 1.77 1.61 1.12
1998 1.38 1.47 1.47 1.47 1.02
1999 1.34 1.42 1.56 1.47 0.98
2000 1.36 1.47 1.68 1.60 1.04
2001 1.33 1.30 1.40 1.41 0.93
2002 1.32 1.17 1.34 1.37 0.94
2003 1.29 1.17 1.24 1.25 0.90
2004 1.29 1.16 1.18 1.24 0.93
2005 1.25 1.08 1.12 1.25 0.97
2006 1.32 1.13 1.12 1.26 0.98
Projected % 
growth, UN medium 
projection, 2005–30*
Population –4.3 2.8 n.a. 20.2 22.3
15–64 age group –17.0 –8.7 n.a. –0.3 4.2
15–24 age group –20.0 –36.9 n.a. –25.2 –15.3
Projected % growth, 
UN low projection, 
2005–30*
Population –9.9 –4.3 n.a. 12.7 13.0
15–64 age group –19.8 –12.2 n.a. –3.3 0.9
15–24 age group –37.7 –53.1 n.a. –42.3 –38.2
Source: Japan: Ministry of Health and Welfare, Vital Statistics, various years; Korea: June 2004, 
Table 3.6; Hong Kong: Census and Statistics Department, The Government of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (using resident population approach); Taiwan Province of China: Tsay, 2003. 
Figures for 2003–2006 from Department of Household Registration Affairs, Ministry of Interior; 
Singapore: Singapore Department of Statistics, various years.
* United Nations Population Division, 2006. 
programs (Robinson and Ross (eds), 2007). Japan’s situation was different, in 
that it had already reached replacement-level fertility at that time. The history of 
population policies in the other four countries, adopted to deal with a situation 
contrasting so sharply with the current demographic prospects they face, should 
be kept in mind in understanding delays in altering policies to respond to changing 
circumstances, as discussed below.
Governments in ultra-low-fertility countries are now arguing that raising birth 
rates is crucial for national survival and welfare. But the change from anti-natalist 
to pro-natalist policies did not come easily. Singapore was the first government in 
the region to reverse anti-natalist policies. The long lag in recognizing the need 
for policy change meant that the reorganization of policy was abrupt, and some-
what shocking to the general public, who had long grown used to anti-natalist 
messages. Singapore’s fertility fell to replacement level in 1975, but it was not 
until 1986 that the first signs of a change in policy were seen, with a government 
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Very low fertility in Pacific Asian countries 5
announcement of plans to review population policies and dialogue sessions with 
the public. Pro-natalist measures were finally introduced in 1987, 12 years after 
replacement fertility had been reached and with fertility close to 25 percent below 
replacement level.3 The curious result of the haste in which the policy changes 
were made was that almost overnight anti-natalist messages were replaced by 
pro-natalist measures on the nation’s bus stops and other places, presumably to the 
bemusement of a populace well primed to follow the exhortations of a seemingly 
omniscient government.
The Korean government showed a similar reluctance to modify policies after 
fertility fell below replacement level in 1984. By 1990, fertility was well below 
replacement level, prompting a debate on population policies.
Those supporting continuation of fertility control argued that the current level 
of low fertility is mostly due to the strong population control policies and the 
change of policies would bring the fertility level up resulting in rapid popu-
lation growth again, slowing down economic growth and effecting heavy 
burdens on environment and resources. Those supporting the relaxation of 
fertility control policies argued that the socioeconomic conditions of Korea 
have changed greatly resulting in changes in attitudes and values towards 
preference for small size families. They also argued that further decline in 
fertility would result in rapid population aging and increasing burden of 
support for the elderly.
(Choe and Park, 2005: 8)
It was not until 1996 that the emphasis of population policy was shifted from 
population control to quality and welfare of the population, one of the aims being 
to prevent fertility from declining further from its level of 1.7 at that time.
Taiwan’s fertility had been below replacement level for eight years before a new 
population policy statement was issued by the Executive Yuan, calling for raising 
fertility to replacement levels. However, there were no explicit proposals as to 
how to raise the marriage rate or the birth rate. In an assessment of this policy, 
Freedman and Freedman (1993: 28) wrote: “We see nothing in the new policy 
statement that is likely to have an effect on fertility levels, one way or the other. 
Therefore, the balance of the existing pro-natalist and anti-natalist influences in 
the society are likely to determine what actually happens”. It was not until 2006, 
22 years after fertility fell below replacement level, that any national-level pro-
natalist policies were introduced, although a few county-level administrative units 
had introduced small-scale pro-natalist measures.
Japan followed a different fertility trajectory, having experienced below-
replacement-level fertility over the 1970s and 1980s. Although, unlike the other 
countries, it did not have anti-natalist policies to reverse, it was not until it reached 
a record low TFR of 1.57 in 1990 that the government started looking into possible 
measures to reverse the downward trend. 
As for China, the implementation of the “one-child policy” after 1979 has 
been greatly modified over time, and the “one-child policy” these days applies 
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6 Gavin Jones, Paulin Tay Straughan, and Angelique Chan 
to only 35 percent of China’s population (Gu, Chapter 4, this volume). Neverthe-
less, China’s population policy remains clearly anti-natalist. There is controversy 
over China’s current fertility levels, but it is clear that fertility is so far below 
replacement level that China is actually in much the same position that Singapore 
was in 1975: namely, of having succeeded in the policy of fertility reduction, but 
being slow to “take off the brakes” when fertility slid well below replacement 
level. In China, many interpret the slide in fertility to well below replacement 
level as a sign of success. On the other hand, the population structure, aging 
and other issues arising from recent low fertility levels (compounded by the 
distorted age structures inherited as a legacy of past events – notably the plan-
ning disaster of the “Great Leap Forward” – and changing population policy) 
have been well publicized in the literature. Many demographers and economists 
are now arguing that pro-natalist policies are needed (Wang Feng, 2005; Zeng 
Yi, 2007). But government leaders and the population-control establishment 
have been slow to change their mindset. In February 2008, the Vice Minister 
of the National Population and Family Planning Commission did announce 
that China is considering “incrementally” lifting limits on the number of chil-
dren a couple can have – an announcement that appeared to be subsequently 
rebutted by Premier Wen Jiabao (Straits Times, March 6, 2008). But even the 
initial announcement indicated a weakening of anti-natalist measures, rather 
than foreshadowing a switch to pro-natalism.
There is therefore a fascinating history with respect to the change of govern-
ment policy in East Asian countries in response to changing demographic 
circumstances. South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and China all had long-standing 
policies to lower fertility, centered on family planning programs. Their delays 
in reversing policy can be summarized by noting the number of years that their 
TFR had fallen below replacement level, and the percentage below replacement 
reached at the time policy was altered, as shown in Table 1.2. It should be noted 
that in the cases of South Korea and Taiwan, though policies were modified at 
earlier points in time, it was more than 20 years after the replacement fertility 
level was breached that more serious pro-natalist measures were introduced. The 
same may well turn out to be the case in China. 
Why the delay? There were probably three main reasons:
Demographic momentum meant that population kept increasing despite  •
below-replacement fertility, thus seemingly obviating the need to modify 
or reverse policy. This is certainly a major reason for the continuation of a 
strongly anti-natalist policy in China.
Inertia and the entrenched bureaucratic interests and mindsets of agencies  •
entrusted with anti-natalist policies and leaders who had been promoting 
anti-natalist policies.
A deficiency in the theory of demographic transition. Little attention was given  •
to what happens after fertility reaches replacement level, and the assump-
tion prevailed that fertility would not fall far below replacement (Demeny, 
1997). The United Nations Population Division population projections for a 
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Very low fertility in Pacific Asian countries 7
long time assumed, against all the evidence, that TFRs that had sunk below 
replacement level, even well below this level, would gradually rebound to 
replacement level. This added official weight to the idea that there was no 
need for a policy response to very low fertility.
Pro-natalist policies, family policy and social policy in the 
very low-fertility countries
Before giving some details about pro-natalist policies in Asian countries, we 
will set these in a broader context by looking first at some aspects of family 
policy in general, and considering how it has been used in European low-fer-
tility countries. One thing to keep in mind is that, unlike in East Asia, “in most 
European countries overt population-policy measures would meet resistance 
rather than acclamation among the population” (Neyer, 2003: 49). But family 
policy measures are an acceptable means of encouraging child-bearing. Of 
course, family policies are difficult to conceptualize and measure, and repre-
sent a diverse range of policy objectives. The primary purpose is not always 
connected to child-bearing and child-raising as such. Because of this diversity, 
“family policies may encompass inconsistent or even divergent aims” (Neyer, 
2003: 51).
McDonald (2002: 435) classifies policies directed toward the reversal of low 
fertility into three broad categories:
Table 1.2 Delays in reversing anti-natalist policies, selected East Asian countries 
Country Year in which 
replacement 
fertility was 
reached
Year in which 
anti-natalist 
policy was 
reversed
Number 
of years 
elapsed
% below 
replacement 
when policy 
reversed
Comments
Singapore 1975 1987 12 25 —
South Korea 1984 1996 12 20 Very mildly 
pro-natalist policies
South Korea 1984 2004 20 50 More serious 
pro-natalist measures
Taiwan 1984 1992  8 20 Pro-natalist statement 
but no measures
Taiwan 1984 2006 22 47 Specific pro-natalist 
measures under 
consideration
Japan 19731 1990 17 25 Mildly pro-natalist 
measures
China 1992 No reversal 16 (+) — 25% below 
replacement in 2007; 
policy not altered
1 Actually, Japan’s TFR was slightly below replacement level as early as the 1950s, but it hovered 
around that level for two decades, and did not fall definitively below replacement level until 1973.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [S
ing
ap
or
e M
an
ag
em
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 1
9:2
2 2
7 J
uly
 20
17
 
8 Gavin Jones, Paulin Tay Straughan, and Angelique Chan 
financial incentives •
support for parents to combine work and family •
broad social change supportive of children and parenting. •
The first category includes child benefits (public transfers paid for children). The 
second includes such items as maternity-leave policies, parental-leave policies 
(leaves of absence from employment granted parents by law in order to take care 
of their child during the first few years of life), and childcare services (offered by 
the state, the market, employers or non-profit institutions). The extent to which 
support of these kinds is provided to parents varies greatly between European 
countries, largely according to the kind of welfare-state regime they follow. 
Common classifications of welfare-state regimes in Europe distinguish between 
universalistic welfare states (the Nordic countries), conservative welfare states 
(continental European countries), liberal welfare states (Anglo-Saxon countries), 
and Southern European welfare states (see, for example, Gauthier, 2002, Table 1). 
Conservative welfare states rely heavily on familialism – that is, on the family 
as a provider of welfare. Southern European countries display an even higher 
degree of familialism. In this respect, Southern European countries clearly have 
an important element in common with the East Asian countries currently facing 
the issue of how to raise birth rates, to match the other element they share in 
common: that of having the lowest levels of fertility in the world. It has been 
argued persuasively by McDonald (2000a; 2000b) that the sharing of these two 
common elements is not accidental; it is precisely their familialism, in the context 
of widened educational and employment opportunities for women, that poses 
strong conflicts of interest for women and leads to delayed marriage and low 
levels of child-bearing.
To return to the Asian countries that are the focus of this paper, we will summa-
rize briefly the kinds of pro-natalist policies some of these countries have been 
introducing.
Japan 
Japan4 has gradually been cranking up its pro-natalist policies as the level of 
concern with very low fertility rises. Japanese policy has followed two main 
approaches: direct subsidies for child-bearing and child-raising; and changing 
the institutional framework to facilitate marriage and child-raising. As in many 
other countries, child allowances (first introduced in 1972) were a family policy 
measure to assist low-income families, rather than a pro-natalist measure. But 
after 1990, pro-natalist concerns led to large increases in the allowances, though 
an eligibility criterion remains. In 1991, unpaid leave for childcare was intro-
duced, though part-time workers were excluded. The “Angel Plan,” introduced 
in 1994, called for major expansion of childcare centres, with eligibility criteria 
varying by locality. Later, part payment during childcare leave was introduced.
In 1999 the “New Angel Plan” called for further expansion of the heavily subsi-
dized day-care centres, after-school programs and family support centres. In 2001, 
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Very low fertility in Pacific Asian countries 9
the proportion of salary received by an employee on childcare leave was raised 
from 25 percent to 40 percent, and this was raised to 50 percent in late 2007.
It seems that many employees, especially women, were not taking childcare 
leave because of social disapproval from fellow workers. Thus the government 
introduced measures aimed at creating an atmosphere within firms that would 
encourage parents to take the childcare leave to which they were entitled. 
Complying firms could use a logo saying “we support child-bearing among our 
employees”. Finally, in 2005, the government extended the right to childcare leave 
to part-time workers, under certain circumstances. Workers on short-term (for 
example, three-month or six-month) contracts whose contracts were not renewed 
were not eligible for such leave, however. 
The gradual gearing up of pro-natalist policies in Japan is clear, but it is note-
worthy that large tax deductions for children are not yet entertained. Moreover, 
the typically very small contribution of husbands to housework and child-rearing 
tasks (see Tsuya et al., 2005) means that the burden borne by the working wife 
remains very high. Without change in broader gender relations in Japan, the task 
of raising fertility appears formidable.
South Korea5
In 1996, the South Korean government adopted new population-policy goals, in 
the face of continuing declines in fertility (the TFR had been around 1.6 or 1.7 
for a decade). However, these goals were hardly pro-natalist, but rather empha-
sized maintaining the level of fertility, better reproductive health, redressing the 
imbalance in sex ratios at birth and reducing the incidence of induced abortion, 
tackling the sex-related problems of youth and adolescence, and empowering 
women by expanding employment opportunities and welfare services for them 
(Cho and Lee, 2000: 151–161).
A decade later, with fertility dipping even lower, in 2006 the Korean govern-
ment was developing policies (“Vision 2020”) in response to low fertility and an 
aging society. It is attempting to create a favorable environment for childbirth and 
child-rearing by transferring some of the burden of child-raising from family to 
society. More specifically, subsidies for the costs of child-rearing and education, 
currently available for low-income groups, are to be available for the middle class 
as well. Day-care for children up to age 4 would be subsidized according to the 
family’s income level. After-school programs would be expanded, particularly 
for lower-grade primary school children, as an alternative to expensive private 
tutoring institutions. Taxes would also be lowered for households with young 
dependent children or large families, and the tax system altered to reduce the 
costs of health insurance for such families. The introduction of a child-allowance 
system, which Korea as yet does not have, is being seriously considered. 
Childcare facilities are to be expanded in number and quality, with the govern-
ment playing a central role. This is part of an effort to create a family-friendly 
and gender-equal social culture, making work and family more compatible. 
Companies providing maternity leave will be supported. Women workers at small 
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10 Gavin Jones, Paulin Tay Straughan, and Angelique Chan 
to mid-sized firms who take maternity leave can receive up to three months of 
employment insurance protection. Starting in 2008, male partners will automati-
cally receive three days off to help after childbirth. Childcare leave that hitherto 
applied only to parents of children under the age of one will now be extended to 
children up to three years of age.
Singapore6
Tracing the history of anti-natalist policy in Singapore is complicated by the fact 
that for a period of time, beginning in 1984, Singapore adopted policies that were 
seemingly unique in Asia. These policies were selectively pro-natalist for the 
well-educated but anti-natalist for the poorly educated. They were adopted in the 
interests of improving the genetic quality of the population, but not directed at a 
general increase in fertility rates.
Not very long after that, in 1987 however, Singapore reversed its fertility objec-
tives. Since then, it has experimented with a wide range of measures designed 
to raise fertility. The general trend has been towards a strengthening of these 
measures over time, and especially since the further downward trend in fertility 
since 1996.7 The first task was to loosen or abandon the old anti-natalist poli-
cies, and this was gradually done (Saw, 2005: Chapter 11). A number of limited 
pro-natalist measures were also introduced in 1987. For example, couples having 
a third child were given priority in getting access to a larger HDB apartment 
through sale of their smaller apartment, and tax rebates were granted for third or 
fourth children. Subsequently, the involvement of the government in encouraging 
marriage was widened from a concern with ensuring that well-educated women 
married (through the Social Development Unit) to a broader program targeting 
also the non-tertiary educated.
Further pro-natalist policies were announced in 2000, with the introduction of 
the baby bonus scheme for second and third children. The scheme consists of 
a two-tier payment given annually by the government for a period of six years 
after the birth of the child. The first tier is an outright cash gift (paid in five instal-
ments over five years), totalling S$3,000 for the second child and S$5,000 for the 
third child, while in the second tier both parents and government contribute to a 
co-savings account. The scheme has been structured so that the funds must be 
used solely for the benefit of the children. Other pro-natalist provisions announced 
in 2000 included limited arrangments for paid leave in the public sector to marry 
and to attend to sick children, flexible working hours, and childcare subsidy for 
enrolment in childcare centres.
In 2004, it was decided that these measures had been insufficient, and a raft 
of new schemes were introduced, including a Medisave maternity package and 
extra paid maternity leave (extending paid maternity leave from the 8 weeks in 
2001 to 12 weeks). In addition there were: further modification of the provisions 
for getting an HDB apartment to encourage marriage; extensions to the baby 
bonus from the second and third children to include the first and fourth child; 
an increase in the subsidy paid by the government for enrolment of an infant 
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Very low fertility in Pacific Asian countries 11
in childcare; a more liberal parenthood tax rebate; and a streamlined working 
mother’s child-relief scheme. Further measures announced in 2004 included: 
provision of the statutory two-day paid childcare leave for a parent of a child 
under 7 years of age; a lower maid levy for parents with children under 12 years 
of age; tax relief for working mothers where the grandparent serves as care-giver; 
introduction of a five-day working week in the civil service (though the week’s 
total working hours remain the same); equal medical benefits for male and female 
civil servants; and incentives for firms to seek better “work-life harmony” for 
their employees.
Taiwan
As noted earlier, the new population policy announced in Taiwan in 1992, though 
advocating the maintenance of reproduction at the replacement level, and essentially 
ending the family planning program, included no specific pro-natalist measures. It 
seems that even up to the present no financial incentives have been provided for child-
bearing, except for limited tax deductions and, in 2007, free kindergarten schooling 
for low income families. Policies have included the exhortation for more single 
Taiwanese to marry, but the rapid rise in marriages between Taiwanese men and 
foreign women (Tsay, 2004) appears to have caught the government by surprise.
Assessment of policies in these East Asian countries
How do the pro-natalist policies in Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan compare 
with those in European countries? A systematic assessment of this would require 
much more time and resources than we are able to apply to it, but instead we 
will try to put forward a few generalizations. First, these Asian countries follow 
a familialist approach that places much higher expectations on the family to 
provide the kinds of support needed for children and the elderly than is the 
case in the European countries, with the possible exception of the Mediterranean 
countries. Second, the amount of resources put into the first two kinds of family 
support programs listed above (financial incentives, and support for parents to 
combine work and family) is far less in these Asian countries than in the Scan-
dinavian countries or indeed in European countries in general, again with the 
possible exception of the Mediterranean countries. Third, the range of policies 
in the ultra-low fertility Asian countries (except Taiwan) has widened consid-
erably in recent years and the financial resources provided for these policies 
are growing rapidly. Fourth, there is a long way to go in bringing about broad 
social change supportive of children and parenting in these countries. Thus, for 
example, in Japan and Korea there is evidence of only a glacially slow change in 
the amount of time husbands put into household tasks and child-rearing in fami-
lies where both spouses are working (Tsuya and Bumpass (eds), 2004; Tsuya 
et al., 2005).
The policies recently introduced by South Korea appear to illustrate the “too 
little, too late” problem – Korean fertility is probably now the lowest in the world 
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12 Gavin Jones, Paulin Tay Straughan, and Angelique Chan 
among countries with populations over 30 million, yet the range of policies 
introduced in 2006 appears modest compared with that in the European low-
fertility countries.
What has been the effect of pro-natalist programs on 
fertility?
There is a substantial literature on the effect of family planning programs on fertility 
(see, for example, Ross and Forrest, 1978; United Nations, 1979; Mauldin, 1983; 
Phillips and Ross (eds), 1992) and an almost equally substantial literature on the 
effect on fertility of pro-natalist measures adopted by the low-fertility countries 
(summarized in Neyer, 2003: 78–81; see also Gauthier and Hatzius, 1997). In both 
cases, the problem for measurement is the uncertainty about the “counter-factual”: 
what would have happened to fertility in the absence of the programs? 
There are, of course, many ways to deal with this problem, none of them 
yielding absolutely trustworthy conclusions, hence the continuing spate of writ-
ings on the subject. The most sophisticated studies on the anti-natalist effects of 
family planning programs have dealt with population-based methods measuring 
the net program effects upon fertility for the population as a whole. These can be 
grouped as areal regression techniques, multilevel regression and experimental 
design (for details, see Ross and Lloyd, 1992: 36–43; Phillips et al., 1988). 
In this book we are more interested in assessing the impact of pro-natalist 
programs on fertility. But before attempting such an exercise, it is necessary to 
have some idea of the underlying causes of the decline in fertility to very low 
levels in these East Asian countries. Only when the causes are reasonably well 
understood is it likely to be possible to assess the impact of policy.
Background factors influencing the decline to ultra-low fertility in 
East Asia 
The context in which delayed marriage and sharp fertility declines have occurred 
in East Asia has been one in which women’s educational levels have been rising 
and their workforce participation generally increasing. Concurrent with the rapid 
rise in numbers of women with secondary and tertiary education, there has been a 
very sharp rise in the proportion of females working. Trends in labor-force partici-
pation rates (LFPRs) for women aged 25–39 in Japan, Singapore and South Korea 
are shown in Table 1.3. In both Japan and Singapore, there was a sharp increase 
from 1975 onwards for all three age groups. In South Korea, by contrast, it was 
only after 1985 that female participation rates rose sharply, and even then to levels 
well below those in Japan or Singapore. 
The sharp rise in LFPRs in Japan and Singapore coincided with sharp increases 
in delayed marriage (Jones, 2007). The delayed increase in LFPRs in South 
Korea was consistent with the much later onset of delayed marriage for females 
in that country. Causation, of course, remains difficult to determine, because of 
the “chicken and egg” issue: did women remain single longer because they were 
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Very low fertility in Pacific Asian countries 13
in the workforce, or were they in the workforce because they were still single? 
In Japan, which has the best data for examining these issues, the fact that the 
labor-force participation rate (LFPR) increased faster after 1975 for women 
aged 25–29 than for women in other age groups indicates that some reverse 
causality was occurring at age 25–29 (Retherford et al., 2001: 77). There was a 
major increase in the proportion single in this age group, and because the LFPR 
was much higher for single women, this drove up the LFPR independently of 
other factors that were also driving up this rate. But the LFPR for single women 
was also rising over this period (from 81 percent in 1972 to 92 percent in 1999). 
Retherford et al. (2001: 82) claim that there is evidence of a substantial increase 
in the opportunity cost for women of quitting their job to marry and have chil-
dren, which would have driven up the age at marriage, though this pressure may 
be decreasing because a declining proportion of women are quitting the labor 
force after marriage and first birth, especially in the period between 1995 and 
1998.
In theory, young people may be avoiding marriage for reasons that differ from 
those that influence married couples to avoid having children. For example, 
marriage itself could be seen by young women intent on pursuing a career as a 
distraction from their goal, or they may be delaying it until, inadvertently, they find 
that they are faced by a lack of suitable partners (the “good man is hard to find” 
syndrome). In reality, however, marriage is a package, as it is not simply about 
the relationship between two people, but tightly linked with child-bearing, child-
rearing, and other family obligations. Thus the delay in marriage in the region is 
undoubtedly linked to a considerable – though not easily measurable – extent with 
the same kinds of concerns that are influencing married couples to delay child-
bearing or to have only one or two children. To marry without the intention to 
have children is still considered aberrant behavior throughout the region. There is 
no doubt that after marrying young couples are subjected to considerable pressure 
to have a baby, from family and to a lesser extent from friends. The easiest way to 
Table 1.3 Labor-force participation rates for females in Japan, Singapore, and South 
Korea, certain age groups, 1960–2000
Japan Singapore South Korea
25–29 30–34 35–39 25–29 30–34 35–39 25–29 30–34 35–39
1970 46 48 46 31 23 19 31.7 36.3 43.1
1975 43 44 43 47 32 29 35.1 40.7 49.3+
1980 49 48 49 59 44 37 34.1 46.1 55.5
1985 54 51 54 67 49 45 35.9 43.2 55.8
1990 61 52 61 76 63 55 42.8 49.6 58.0
1995 66 54 66 79 64 58 47.8 47.5 59.2
2000 70 57 70 84** 74** 63** 55.9 48.5 59.1
2004 74 61 74 86 77 68 63.9 50.4 58.9
Source: Jones, 2007: Table 5.
** 2001.
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14 Gavin Jones, Paulin Tay Straughan, and Angelique Chan 
avoid this is to remain single. Although single people are also pressured to marry, 
this may be less than that exerted on married couples to produce their first child.
The arguments against having children, especially for upwardly mobile women 
throughout the region, appear compelling. Not only are the opportunity costs 
of having children alarmingly high, but the actual financial costs of raising and 
educating children are also very substantial. These financial costs have been esti-
mated at US$253,000 for an average family in Korea, based on a survey conducted 
by the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs,8 and about the same level for 
Singapore. When opportunity costs are added in as well, it has been estimated that 
for female university graduates in Japan, the costs of raising and educating a child 
could well exceed 1 million US dollars. (For the data on which this estimate is 
based, see Retherford and Ogawa, 2005: 15–16.)
The role of women in these South-East and East Asian societies may provide 
additional reasons to avoid bearing children. Patriarchal attitudes among employers 
and in government, resulting in poor workplace provision for the needs of working 
mothers (including lack of flexible working hours, childcare leave and provision 
of crèches), and reluctance of husbands to take much of the housework and child-
rearing tasks from working wives, adds considerable stress to the lives of women 
with children. The extreme pressure in countries such as Japan, South Korea and 
Singapore to raise high-quality children, and the unequal role given to mothers in 
achieving this goal, is another strong deterrent to beginning the process of family 
building (see, for example, Hirao, 2004).
There are, then, clearly substantial obstacles to raising fertility rates in the 
ultra-low fertility countries. But this is not a reason to despair about the possible 
efficacy of policy. Not only in these East Asian countries but also in the low-
fertility countries of Europe, women report family size ideals that are very close to 
the levels needed for population replacement (Quah, 2003: 71–73; Prachuabmoh 
and Mithranon, 2003: 39–40). 
There is an argument that expressed fertility desires do not prove very much 
about “real” fertility desires in low-fertility situations. In the European countries 
with well-below-replacement fertility, expressed desired fertility is much above 
the actual levels of fertility and rarely falls below two, nor does it differ much by 
cohort or social group (Van de Kaa, 2001; Bachrach, 2001). Indeed, international 
evidence indicates that there tends to be a crossover in actual and expressed desired 
family size when actual family size falls to levels a little above replacement level. 
Above this level, desired fertility tends to be below actual, but below this level 
the reverse holds (Bongaarts, 2001: 263–266). As Livi Bacci (2001: 284) notes, 
“the suspicion is that stated preferences are heavily influenced by stereotypes and 
particularly by the model of the two-child family (a boy and a girl). This stereotype 
is pervasive and many surveyed individuals are ‘prisoners’ of it”. 
It would be inappropriate, however, to push such an argument to the extreme 
of concluding that expressed preferences give no cause for optimism about 
the possible efficacy of pro-natalist policy. As McDonald (2006: 485) argues, 
“in expressing higher ‘ideal preferences’ on average, women are effectively 
commenting upon the nature of the social-institutional setting in which they 
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Very low fertility in Pacific Asian countries 15
consider having children”. The interest of society is in assisting them to realize 
their stated desires, in two key ways:
by designing policies that make it more desirable for individual women to  •
have children within the given social-institutional setting;
by altering aspects of the social-institutional setting that influence their  •
fertility decisions.
Assessment of the impact of pro-natalist programs on fertility 
The preceding paragraphs summarize the East Asian setting in which pro-natalist 
policies are being practiced. Western countries, especially in Europe, have a longer 
history of pro-natalism, and the impact of pro-natalist programs on fertility in this 
setting has been discussed by various authors (for example, McDonald, 2002, 
2006; Castles, 2003; Grant et al., 2004; Adkins, 2003; Neyer, 2003). Assessment 
of the impact of these policies on fertility has often been pessimistic, but, by and 
large, the references cited support the argument that direct child-support payments 
have a positive impact on fertility, as does greater childcare availability, with the 
evidence on the effect of family-friendly workplaces more mixed. McDonald 
(2002: 442) argues that the impact of individual pro-natalist measures can rarely 
be treated in isolation, because the effect of any policy will depend on the broader 
setting:
A range of brilliant gender equity policies will be ineffective if unemploy-
ment rates are high for young people of childbearing age. Work and family 
policies can only work if there is work. Likewise, these same gender equity 
policies would be put under strain if the direct financial costs of children were 
very high or if the general tenor of the social setting was child-unfriendly.
As Sleebos (2003: 5) argues, “what is required is coherent application of a range 
of well-designed interventions, applied consistently over time”. 
The general consensus about pro-natalist policies in East Asian countries seems 
to be that they have failed, because there is no evidence that fertility has risen as 
a result of their introduction. A reasonable response to this is that fertility may 
have fallen even further if these policies had not been introduced. Another is that 
the policies have not gone as far as they might, and in many cases, strengthening 
of policies has occurred only recently, so it is therefore premature to judge their 
apparent lack of success as proof that pro-natalist policies will always fail. 
But it is also true that the methodology of assessing the impact of pro-natalist 
policies on fertility is complex, and that for all countries, the likely efficacy of 
pro-natalist policies is difficult to predict. For example, as noted by Ogawa, 
Retherford and Matsukura (Chapter 3, this volume), programs making it easier 
to combine work and child-rearing can have both fertility reducing and fertility 
increasing effects. On average, for women who are already in the paid workforce, 
the effects of such policies should clearly be to raise their fertility. However, again 
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16 Gavin Jones, Paulin Tay Straughan, and Angelique Chan 
on average, by pulling some housewives into the labor force, this is likely to lower 
their fertility, since working women have lower fertility than housewives:
Which of these two effects predominates depends partly on:
the magnitude of pre-existing fertility differences between workers and • 
housewives
how much the fertility of working women rises as a result of the govern-• 
ment’s policies and programs, 
the magnitude of the probability that a housewife will be pulled into the • 
labor force as a result of the government’s policies and programs,
the relative numbers of workers and housewives to begin with.• 
If almost all women are already working, the overall effect will be to raise the TFR. 
If almost all women are housewives, the overall effect will be to lower the TFR. 
(Ogawa, Retherford, and Matsukura, Chapter 3, this volume: p. 67). 
Some implications
The World Population Plan of Action, 1974, Article 14(f) stated: 
All couples and individuals have the basic right to decide freely and respon-
sibly the number and spacing of their children and to have the information 
and means to do so; the responsibility of couples and individuals in the 
exercise of this right takes into account the needs of their living and future 
children, and their responsibilities toward the community. 
This statement is careful in balancing rights and responsibilities. But there is frequently 
a tension between “individual good” and “common good” when it comes to matters of 
optimal family size. Many governments have taken the position that couples, acting on 
their individual right, are collectively causing population to develop in ways that have 
negative consequences for the community and nation, and that governments therefore 
have the responsibility to nudge population trends in ways that are collectively desira-
ble.9 This was the argument for population control policies in high-fertility countries, 
and it is the argument for pro-natalist policies in low-fertility countries. In most low-
fertility countries, under present arrangements, the fact is that the market will provide 
lower benefits to those with children than to those without children, and this affects 
fertility decision-making. “The collapse of birth rates in most industrialized countries 
is telling evidence of the failure of the market approach to allow social reproduction 
to proceed” (McDonald, 2002: 432). Governments, then, must act to redress the situ-
ation, but the corporate sector needs to be supportive, given the likely impact of many 
pro-natalist policies on its “bottom line”. 
The efforts to reduce fertility in high-fertility countries undoubtedly paid off 
in terms of slowing population growth, providing a context more favorable to 
poverty alleviation and providing a greater chance that humankind can reach a 
population equilibrium without putting intolerable strain on the earth’s resources. 
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Very low fertility in Pacific Asian countries 17
It is striking, though, that governments have proven to be far from omniscient in 
determining appropriate population policies. As we have seen, they have frequently 
been very slow to react to changing circumstances, for example, in failing to 
release the policy-imposed brakes on population growth early enough after their 
fertility level has fallen below replacement level. This raises the following issue: 
at the present time, which countries should be following a policy that is neither 
anti-natalist nor pro-natalist? We would argue that countries in which total fertility 
rates have fallen below about 2.7 do not need to follow specifically anti-natalist 
policies any longer, and those whose fertility remains above about 1.8 do not need 
to follow specifically pro-natalist policies. This is because international evidence 
suggests that once TFR declines to 2.7 or so, the decline tends to continue, and 
that countries where TFR is as high as 1.8 or so seem to have their family and 
other policies about right in maintaining their long-term population (and could 
make up any deficit through migration). 
For countries in this key range of one child in the TFR – from about 1.8 to about 
2.7 – attention would be better directed at: 
good-quality reproductive health services directed at the welfare of mothers  •
(and fathers) and children, one element of which would be the encourage-
ment of delay in child-bearing and better spacing; 
development of sound family policies directed towards the welfare of  •
children; 
provision of appropriate options to combine work and child-rearing.  •
In terms of the effects of these policies on fertility, planners can afford to “let the chips 
fall where they may,” of course keeping a watching brief on where they do indeed 
fall. Available evidence suggests that by concentrating on the quality and ready avail-
ability of reproductive health services and on family policy providing financial and 
other support for child-raising and an appropriate “work-life balance” the chips will 
fall appropriately in the sense of keeping fertility from dropping too low. 
Finally, there is need for introspection about many issues of social and family 
policy in the new ultra-low fertility situation. For example, the earlier concern 
about the treatment of women’s reproductive rights in population-control programs 
has surfaced again recently in relation to pro-natalist policy. Women must never 
be viewed as mere pawns in the game of either lowering or raising birth rates. In 
a speech to local members of Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 
January 2007, the Japanese Minister of Health, Hakuo Yanagisawa, said, “Because 
the number of birth-giving machines and devices is fixed, all we can ask for is for 
them to do their best per head”. Although after the subsequent furore, Mr Yana-
gisawa apologized, critics claimed that his words revealed a more widespread 
attitude among male government officials. 
Another issue is that where those who give birth to and raise children are seen to 
be “national heroes” or rather “national heroines,” the kudos given to such parents 
seems to imply an inevitable downplaying of the recognition given to those who 
do not bear and raise babies – the single, the childless couples, the gay couples. 
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18 Gavin Jones, Paulin Tay Straughan, and Angelique Chan 
This seems particularly unfortunate in cases where failure to produce children 
is by circumstance rather than choice – infertile couples; those who would like 
to have children but who have not found a suitable partner; those who choose 
to remain single to care for aging parents. But even in the case of those who 
choose not to have children for what some would judge to be “selfish” reasons, 
the need for a varied, vibrant and inclusive society would seem to dictate that 
people’s contributions to society be judged on a much broader set of criteria than 
whether they produce and raise children to ensure society’s replacement by the 
next generation.
This is not to argue that income redistribution from those who do not produce 
children to those who do is inappropriate. Indeed, given the enormous direct finan-
cial and indirect opportunity costs – to well-educated women in particular – of 
having babies, much more substantial monetary transfers than are presently 
contemplated by countries of East Asia would appear to be necessary.
Notes
1 For example, the poor, semi-arid country of Niger in West Africa faces a trebling (or more) 
of population with very bleak prospects for development (Cleland et al., 2006: 1812).
2 There was a long-running debate over how women’s rights fared under population 
control policies. The debate tended to pit feminists against family planners (see Hart-
mann, 1987; Dixon-Mueller, 1993; Sen, 1994). There were awkward elements to the 
debate on both sides. Feminists had to deal with the evidence of the great need for 
family planning information and methods by women seeking to assert control over 
their fertility, and the potential contribution of appropriately conducted family planning 
programs to meeting this need. The family planners had to confront the evidence that in 
many countries the goal of reducing fertility was given priority over the need to provide 
women with appropriate choices. The argument that women were being treated simply 
as objects producing excess babies was irrefutable when applied to fertility control 
programs in China and India at particular times. The taking up of positions – the need 
for population control on one hand and the need to empower women to take control of 
their own lives on the other – tended to leave little common ground between family 
planning advocates and those arguing for reproductive rights, although, arguably, there 
was a large area of common ground to be occupied.
3 Actually, important modification in Singapore’s population policy had been made in 
1983, when Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s National Day speech discussed the differ-
ences in fertility levels according to the education of the mother. The following year, the 
first pro-natalist programs were launched, but these were only directed to the issue of 
fertility differentials between well-educated and less-educated women, not at raising the 
overall level of fertility.
4 For more detail, see the chapter by Ogawa, Retherford and Matsukura in this book.
5 The following paragraphs draw heavily on Eun, 2007.
6 The following paragraphs draw heavily on Saw, 2005, Chapters 11–13.
7 This downward trend was interrupted by a rise in a single year – 2000 – which was a 
Dragon Year (Saw, 2005: 207–210). This was only a blip in the downward trend. 
8 This survey covered 11,816 children across Korea (Straits Times, 28/10/2007).
9 As Demeny (1986: 476) has argued, “When socially advantageous modification of demo-
graphic behavior is beyond the capacity of private markets to provide, it assumes the 
character of a public good that must be acquired, if at all, through the political market-
place”.
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